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A)  Introduction 
It is often assumed that a constitution speaks with one voice and that all parts are in harmony with 
each other. Although different provisions can be given higher status than others (as reflected in the 
more arduous amendment procedures concerning, for example, national values), the general assump-
tion is that they are all of equal value. Where provisions are seemingly at odds with one another, 
such as cases where there are two rights in a bill of rights lead to conflicting outcomes, the deft in-
terpreter can nevertheless produce a balanced or harmonious end-result. While this approach is nec-
essary for a purposive interpretation of a constitution, it blocks from view a different reality in which 
parts of the constitution are in constant conversation with each other. A particular instance of this is 
the conversation between the federal structure and a bill of rights. 
Tuning into this conversation is not only pertinent from a theoretical perspective but also has practi-
cal consequences. The Community Law Centre at the University of the Western Cape in South Afri-
ca, to which I have been attached for the past two decades, has a dual focus: multi-level government 
and human rights. We have organised ourselves into projects focusing, on the one hand, on local 
government and federalism, and, on the other, socio-economic rights, gender rights, children’s rights 
and prisoners’ rights. This dual focus was not by design so much as historical accident. The first 
director of the Centre, Advocate Dullah Omar, was a leading legal activist in the African National 
Congress who eventually became the first Minister of Justice in the Mandela cabinet and had played 
a strong hand in the drafting of the interim Constitution in 1993; his focus was on the structures of 
government. Other staff members, such as Brigitte Mabandla (who, in the Mbeki cabinet, also be-
came a Minister of Justice), were more interested in the Bill of Rights, in particular the rights of 
women and children. Since then there has been the split in the Centre between the structuralists (fo-
cusing on multi-level government) and the normativists (concerned with human rights). As in many 
an organisation, persons with different areas of specialisation are often not in conversation with each 
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other. The Centre was no different, and the two areas did not talk much to one another – until it hap-
pened that we met up in South Africa’s Constitutional Court. 
The occasion was the first major case on socio-economic rights concerning the right of access to 
adequate housing.1 A destitute, homeless woman called Irene Grootboom sued every level of gov-
ernment – national, provincial and local – for a roof over her head. The Centre’s socio-economic 
rights project filed an amicus curiae brief presenting a minimum core-content argument that the State 
must provide a shelter for Mrs Grootboom. The Centre’s local government project also filed a brief; 
while agreeing on the rights argument, it argued that the obligation to provide a shelter rested on the 
province or national government because housing was, in terms of the Constitution’s division of 
powers, a concurrent national and provincial function in terms of which local government bore no 
obligation.2  
The Constitutional Court rejected both arguments.3 First, although it recognised that this socio-
economic right was subject to judicial review (a major victory for human rights activists), the Court 
rejected the minimum core-content argument as being too prescriptive and onerous on the state. It 
found that the state’s obligations are confined to taking reasonable measures, which in the case at 
hand involved no more than having a policy on emergency housing for the destitute. Second, the 
Court declined to impose an obligation on any specific sphere of government. It held that the state – 
national, provincial and local government – should work cooperatively, as the Constitution demand-
ed, when taking reasonable measures. The outcome of the decision was that, when Mrs Grootboom 
died eight years later, she was still without a roof over her head as the three spheres of government 
somehow could not agree on who should do what. 
The case illustrated to us that there was a dynamic tension between the Bill of Rights and the federal 
structure. One could not assume a harmonious relationship between the two parts: on the one hand, a 
Bill of Rights that limits state power, and a federal structure concerned with the division of powers 
between the centre and provinces and local government. On the contrary, there were overlaps and 
competition between them. 
Over the next decade we saw this dynamic interaction develop even further. The Bill of Rights im-
pacted on the federal structure by limiting provincial and local powers; in turn, provinces and local 
government affected the protection of human rights. What we have witnessed is a conversation be-
tween the Bill of Rights that seeks to protect universal human rights norms and the federal structure 
that seeks enhance subnational autonomy. This conversation was moderated by the Constitutional 
Court, but with subnational governments adding their voices to the conversation. 
The South African conversation raises a number of questions. Where does it fit into the international 
debate on federalism and human rights, and does it have anything to contribute to it? In this context, 
is it inevitable that the Bill of Rights will predominate over federal structures, or is there a suitable 
                                                        
1  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
Section 26 reads:  
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing; 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of this right. 
2  Schedule 4A, Constitution. 
3  On the importance and the jurisprudence of the case, see Liebenberg 2010. 
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equilibrium that allows for the pursuit of both federalism and the protection of human rights? If so, 
what factors shape such an equilibrium? 
This paper first sketches a broad comparative picture of the conversation between federalism and the 
protection of human rights; thereafter it examines the South African conversation more closely, and 
finally draws together the two conversations. 
B) Comparative conversations 
In the international debate there appear to be at least two types of conversations. The first concerns 
how a bill of rights shapes (or, more accurately, restrains) the exercise of power by subnational gov-
ernments, and how, conversely, federal structures influence the content of rights. The second, more 
muted, conversation is about how the Bill of Rights may shape the very structures of a federation. 
1.  A conversation over rights and powers   
1.1  Starting the conversation 
Initially, the conversation between human rights and subnational powers was slow to develop. In the 
United States, the oldest federation with a Bill of Rights, there was no conversation to start with. The 
federal Bill of Rights did not apply to the states, as it was designed to protect citizens against an 
overzealous federal government. Federalism thus protected slavery in the South until the adoption of 
14th Amendment after the Civil War;
4
 thereafter, it took more than a hundred years to make the full 
federal Bill of Rights applicable to the states through the 14th Amendment.
5
 In the words of Justice 
William Brennan, the effect of this was that the US Supreme Court, by «nationalising» civil rights, 
«fundamentally reshaped the law of [the] land»
6
 and «profoundly altered the character of [the US] 
federal system».
7
 The application of the Bill of Rights to the states meant that the Southern states 
could no longer apply racial segregation and that all states had to respect a common standard of due 
process in criminal justice. 
The fear that a bill of rights means the end of subnational autonomy was also present in established 
federations that sought to introduce a bill of rights. The introduction of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms into the Canadian federal constitution in 1982 was thus described as a deliber-
ate nationalising policy by Pierre Trudeau to trump Quebec separatism and extreme provincial de-
centralisation.
8 
To placate federalist fears, a provision was included that allowed a province to pass 
legislation trumping the Charter for a period of five years, a provision that could be renewed.
9
 As 
Kincaid explains it, the latter «shields provincial autonomy from federal intervention as well and, in 
effect, allows the provinces to drill holes in the federally established floor of individual rights protec-
                                                        
4  See Kincaid 2001, 251. 
5  Brennan 1986. 
6  Brennan 1986, 540. 
7  Brennan 1986, 545. 
8  See Gibbons, Knopff and Morton 1984. 
9  Section 33 of the Charter of Rights. 





 He argues that provinces refrained from drilling too many such holes for fear of being seen 
as hostile to individual rights. 
Following hot on the heels of the Canadian success, the Labour Government in Australia – after 
having made various attempts to introduce a comprehensive Bill of Rights in the Commonwealth 
Constitution of 1900 – sought more modestly in 1988 to make only the rights in that Constitution 
(trial by jury, freedom of religion and a limited property right) applicable to the states. This, too, 
failed, as the initiative was rejected by the Senate and a national referendum, partly because a bill of 
rights was perceived as a centralising instrument that would limit state powers.
11
 
The Australian voters were right, of course. A national bill of rights has the effect of centralising 
power and standardising subnational conduct. José Woehrling identifies the ways in which a bill of 
rights centralises power.
12
 First, it transfers some decision- making power from subnational govern-
ments and locates it in federal courts (to which one should add that constitutional courts world-wide 
have a tendency to favour the centre’s priorities over those of subnational governments).
13
 Second, a 
bill of rights consolidates national identity to the detriment of regional identities by creating a sense 
of common citizenship, with Canada serving as a good example of this. Third, where social and 
economic rights are included in a bill, this justifies federal intervention to ensure uniformity of ser-
vices: national social solidarity is preferred over the protection of subnational autonomy.
14
 Fourth, a 
bill of rights standardises subnational conduct; by virtue of being fundamental and universal, rights 
do not admit local exceptions.
15 
Further, where a constitutional court invalidates a law of one subna-
tional government, the same rule applies to all subnational governments; it sets a single standard.
16
 
1.2  Balancing the conversation 
Until this point the conversation was one-directional: a bill of rights impinges on federal autonomy. 
The federalists responded: some form of balance was needed to allow a measure of federal diversity. 
The question, then, was how federal diversity could be balanced with the uniform protection of hu-
man rights, or as John Kincaid puts it, how individual liberty could be balanced with a communitari-
an liberty, the latter referring to the liberty of a subnational unit. Which powers of communitarian 
liberty are to be tolerated in the union and which are to be rejected for unduly infringing on individ-
ual liberty?
17
 He thus poses the question: «[W]hich rights should be treated as fundamental, univer-
sal, and uniform and which rights can be subjected legitimately to variations among communities of 
people holding diverse values?»
18
 
In the US the answer appears to be the following: Where a common view of individual liberty has 
been consolidated, there can be no trade-offs, but where the different components of the union have 
                                                        
10  Kincaid 2001, 252. 
11  Galligan, Knopff and Uhr 1990, 54. 
12  Woehrling 2011, 149–152. 
13  Hrischl 2004. 
14  Woehrling 201, 151.  
15  Fercot (2008, 320) writes that federal courts «‘shape’ the state constitutional orders, and in the name of the pro-
tection of rights, impose on federal entities implicit and ‘indirect’ standards that limit the ability to make choices 
in the exercise of state constitutional powers». 
16  Woehrling 2011, 152. 
17  Kincaid 2011, 251. 
18  Kincaid 2011, 252–3. 
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vastly different views on individual liberties, based on their religious or cultural perspectives, then 
diversity is allowed. Supreme Court decisions since the 1950s show that racial discrimination cannot 
be tolerated, and a consensus view also applies to certain due-process rights. However, the Court has 
shied away from setting clear lines on issues such as the right to die, prayers at schools, and gay 
marriages. On the latter question, it has been argued that the Supreme Court started to protect gay 
rights only when public opinion shifted in that direction;
19
 the Court was thus not an agent of social 
change but a follower. This approach commenced in 1995 with the Rehnquist Court’s limiting of 
national power over the states.
20
 
What emerges is the notion of a minimum floor of rights based on widely shared common values, a 
notion that is, of course, well-entrenched in many jurisdictions. In Germany, for example, the Basic 
Law also provides a minimum standard below which Länder constitutions may not go.
21
 A similar 
notion underlies the doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights, which allows a margin of 
appreciation within member states; this has often been criticised for bringing in a moral relativism at 
odds with the supposed universality of human rights.
22 
The same debate unfolds at national level.
23
 
There is thus a search for a balance between the universality of rights and subnational diversity. 
The first element of this balance is that local diversity per se is at least not seen as discriminatory or 
objectionable.
24
 Going further is more difficult, of course. Some try to locate the balance in the in-
terpretation of the right itself; the proportionality test for limiting rights balances individual rights 
against legitimate state interests. In the case of subnational governments, the value of subnational 
diversity and interests can then be considered appropriately.
25
 
1.3  Setting new norms from below 
Setting a minimum floor of rights does not prevent subnational governments from improving on 
such a floor. As Justice William Brennan argued, the federal protection of civil and political rights 
should set a federal floor of rights, which allows «diversity only above and beyond this federal con-
stitutional floor».
26
 In the US, when the Rehnquist Court restrictively interpreted the federal Bill of 
Rights on the grounds of federalism, Justice Brennan perceived it as «a plain invitation to state 
courts to step into the breach» as «coequal guardians» of civil rights and liberties.
27
 The state courts 
                                                        
19  Calabresi and Bickford 2012, 58. 
20  Calabresi and Bickford 2012, 3. 
21  Fercot 2008, 310. 
22  Benevenisti 1999, 843. 
23  A further manifestation of the problem is the relationship between the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and subsidiarity (Carozza 2003, 39). In terms of the Maastricht Treaty decisions should be tak-
en as closely as possible to the citizens, and the Community may take action only as far the task at hand cannot 
be sufficiently achieved by a member state. It is said that this acts in the context of international human rights 
law, as a mediator between «supranational harmonization and unity, on the one hand, and local pluralism and 
difference, on the other» (Carozza 2003, 40). Carossa further writes (2003, 40): «Despite the risk of legal plural-
ism, the links between subsidiarity and human rights are too important and potentially fruitful to set aside if we 
are to continue to seek an international law that protects both the dignity of the human person and the diversity 
of human society» (emphasis in original). 
24  Woehrling 2011, 152. 
25  Woehrling 2011, 153. 
26  Brennan 1986, 550. 
27  Brennan 1986, 548. 
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did take up the invitation, not only exceeding the minimum federal guarantees but also guaranteeing 
new rights in state constitutions.
28
 
There thus developed a new interest in state constitutions in respect of the extent to which they went 
beyond the federal Bill of Rights. In these constitutions, subnational governments could perform 
their famous role as «laboratories for innovation and experimentation» in which new ideas could be 
tested at state level before introduction at national level.
29
 The guaranteeing of more rights was not 
limited to the US. There are examples in German Länder, Swiss cantons
30 
and Argentinian states. 
The constitution of the state of Cordoba granted women the franchise in 1927, 20 years before the 
federal constitution followed suit.
31 
In addition, it referred to certain international human rights trea-
ties long before the national constitution did so. 
Subnational constitutional may also experiment with new social and economic rights.
32
 In Switzer-
land and Germany, some cantons and Länder have included socio-economic rights that imposed 
positive obligations such as the right to education, a right to shelter and the right to work.
33
 The 
«third-generation» right to the environment was also included in the Cordoba Constitution long be-
fore the national Argentinian constitution reflected it in 1994.
34
 In the case of Argentina, the rights in 
the state constitutions have remained paper rights in that they have been largely unenforced. 
35
 
However, although there are numerous positive examples of subnational constitutions increasing 
human liberty, it is not axiomatic that subnational legislatures, executives or courts will provide a 
better level of protection than the federal constitution or courts. It may even be the exception rather 
than the rule, and human rights violations are often more pervasive at subnational than at national 
level. Certain commentators thus view federalism as dangerous in contexts where the rights of mi-
nority populations could be abused systematically at subnational level,
36 
leading them to conclude 
that subnational constitutionalism is a «promising tool to promote social justice and political legiti-
macy. However, these outcomes are not inherent to the system.»
37
 
2.  Bill of Rights shaping the federal structures themselves   
The question of minorities introduces the second conversation, which concerns the issue of whether 
the federal bill of rights may shape the federal structures themselves and thereby even lead to the 
formation or expansion of subnational powers. 
When a leading federal scholar like Ronald Watts discusses the role of a bill of rights and federal-
ism, he focuses on the right to self-determination of minorities, or group rights claimed by such lin-
guistic or ethnic groups, and the question of whether such rights can be given territorial expression.
38
 
                                                        
28  Kincaid 2011, 252; Smith and Hansen 2008, 65. 
29  New State Co. v Liebmann 285 US 262, 311 (1932) per Justice Brandeis.  
30  Frecot 2008, 312. 
31  Hernandez 2010, 923. 
32  Woehrling 2011, 144. 
33  Fercot 2008, 314. 
34  Hernandez 2010, 919. 
35  Hernandez 2010.  
36  White 2004, 2. 
37  White 2004, 19. 
38  Watts 1999, 104. 
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If that is not possible, his focus shifts to how minorities in subnational entities can be protected from 
these governments through the entrenchment in the national constitution of individual rights related 
to language, culture and religion.  
The bottom-line of this conversation is whether there are group rights that can be expressed in terri-
torial autonomy on the basis of language, culture, ethnicity or religion. The Ethiopian Constitution is 
one of the few constitutions that as of right entitles (in its ambiguous words) any «nationality, nation, 
or people» to self-government.
39
 This right applies not only to the large ethnic groups dominating the 
main regions but to small ethnic minorities who can claim their own ethnic local government in the 
ethnically-based regions.
40
 The right of self-government is expressed separately from the bill of 
rights, but is supported nevertheless by the bill of rights through the individual rights to language 
and culture.  
The clear expression in a constitution of the right of ethnic groups to self-determination or even local 
self-government is rare. More often it is the case that group rights are claimed on the basis of inter-
national law. An example is the claim for self-determination under the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights made before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. In 1992 
the Kantangese Peoples’ Congress, a political formation from the Katanga Province in the erstwhile 
Zaire (today the Democratic Republic of Congo), asked the Commission to recognise the independ-
ence of Katanga on the basis of the right to self-determination. The claim was based not on the fact 
that the Katangese were culturally or linguistically different; the claim instead was they were op-
pressed and discriminated against on the grounds of those differences. In response, the Commission 
noted that self-determination could be exercised in a number of ways – «independence, self-
government, local government, federalism, confederalism, unitarism or any other form [that accords 
with the people’s wishes]». Because the Katangese could not show that their right to participate in 
government was denied, they had no claim to independence. They could, however, «exercise a vari-
ant of self-determination that is compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire».
41
 
This could mean only a form of federalism, which was realised 13 years later when the 2005 DRC 
Constitution instituted a hybrid-federal system of government.
42
 
In the case that the Anglophone Cameroonians brought against the unitarist Cameroon government 
(which was dominated by francophones), they claimed independence on the basis of the right to self-
determination and the systematic violation of numerous human rights. Again, the Commission did 
not entertain the self-determination claim, although it did find there was a range of discriminatory 
practices and laws that should be remedied. It recommended that the parties «enter […] into con-
structive dialogue» to resolve the constitutional issues, which centred on forms of self-determination 
within a single state.
43
 Both communications implied that a federal-type arrangement should flow 




                                                        
39  See Fessha 2010. 
40  Ayele 2012. 
41  Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaire 75/92. 
42  See Kabemba 2005; Putzel et al 2008. 
43  Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al v Cameroon, 266/2003, African Commission Communication decided at 45th 
Ordinary Session13-27 May 2009. 
44  See, for example, Awasom 2011. 
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A diluted variant of the right to self-determination is the claimed «right to local self-government». 
The claim is based not on nationhood but the right of political participation founded in both national 
and international human rights instruments. I have encountered this argument among those of my 
students who, having completed Masters’ degrees in human rights and democracy, look through the 
prism of human rights and see the possibility of a better world. The «right to local government» is 
then envisaged as the true culmination of democracy, a culmination expressed through the rights of 
political participation. The argument for decentralisation is not only that it enhances the quality of 
democracy, but that democracy itself requires decentralised government. The Council of Europe’s 
Charter on Local Self-Government and its principle of subsidiarity are cited in support of this view. 
In particular, decisions should be taken at the lowest possible level where decision-makers would be 
accountable to those subject to their decisions.
45
 To date, little headway has been made with an en-
forceable principle of subsidiarity that would result in the guaranteeing of local self-government. 
Although the principle of local self-governance is not entertained by courts, it is gaining ground also 
in Africa in the «soft» regional instruments on democracy and good government.
46
 
In summary, while it is recognised that a national bill of rights closes down subnational space, a 
restrictive interpretation of that bill has allowed in some cases a modicum of federal diversity: hav-
ing set a minimum floor of rights, subnational governments can go beyond that floor. But thus far 
the expression of minority group rights in a demarcated territory has found limited traction, with the 
«right to local self-government» holding even less appeal. 
C) Constitutional conversation in South Africa 
1.  Introduction   
Turning to South Africa, we see similar conversations under way but articulated in a distinctive local 
dialect. The new democratic Constitutions of 1993 and 1996 introduced both a Bill of Rights and 
provincial and local governments. The former enjoys an exalted place in the Constitution, providing 
extensive protection of individual rights after the ravages of apartheid and positing «human dignity, 
the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms» as the new consti-
tutional order’s founding values.
47
 By contrast, the «federal» provisions relating to provinces were a 
reluctant compromise made in the course of the negotiated revolution – reluctant, because it was 
feared that these provisions would spark a return to the ethnic divisions of the apartheid era.
48
 Con-
sequently, a federal or devolved system of government was not included in the list of founding val-
ues, where the emphasis was instead on South Africa being «one sovereign, democratic state».
49 
A 
provincial sphere of government was established with a limited but entrenched list of exclusive pow-
ers and a more extensive list of concurrent powers shared with the national government. It is a highly 
centralised system, as provinces have no direct access to tax bases of their own. In contrast, local 
                                                        
45  International Human Rights Council 2002: 9. 
46  See Fessha andKirkby 2008.  
47  Section 1(a) Constitution 1996. 
48  Steytler 2005. 
49  Section 1 Constitution 1996. 
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government, now recognised as a constitutional order of government with entrenched powers, has 
the constitutional power to levy property taxes and surcharges on fees.
50
 
From the outset the Constitutional Court, sitting at the apex of an integrated judiciary, did not value 
provincial autonomy highly and gave mostly pro-centre decisions when it came to the division of 
powers between the provinces and the national government.
51
 However, it has been more accommo-
dating towards local government, with the result that we see the proverbial hourglass federation – a 
large national government at the top, strong local government at the bottom, and a small provincial 
waist in the middle.
52 
 
2.  The conversation on rights and powers   
2.1  Managing the conversation 
The first conservation on how the Bill of Rights shaped and limited the powers of provinces and 
local government followed much of the international script. The Bill of Rights, applicable to all three 
spheres of government, constrained the powers of the subnational governments in equal measure to 
that of the national government. First, the equality clause ensured that provinces did not discriminate 
on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 9, and a provincial statute dating from the apartheid era 
was invalidated because it indirectly discriminated on the basis of race.
53 
However, the Court made it 
clear that provincial diversity per se did not constitute unfair discrimination provided it did not dif-
ferentiate on the prohibited grounds (including race, language, sexual orientation, etc.) or analogous 
grounds – all of which are based on personal characteristics, not on territory.
54
 
When applying socio-economic rights, the Constitutional Court was also hesitant to set an inflexibly 
uniform standard applicable to all municipalities. When a township dweller sought to enforce his 
right of access to adequate water, he argued that the City of Johannesburg’s policy of providing 25 
litres per day for free was inadequate; he wanted double that amount because it was reasonable and 
within the City’s resources. One should note here that the socio-economic rights of access to health-
care services, sufficient food and water, adequate housing and social security, are circumscribed in 
that the state needs to take only reasonable measures within its available resources to achieve the 
progressive realisation of these rights.
55 
 
However, the Constitutional Court refused to set a specific amount of water per day. All that was 
required is for the municipality to take reasonable measures, which should aim at progressively real-
ising the right. The measures taken could hence differ from one municipality to the next depending 
                                                        
50  See Steytler 2005. 
51  Steytler 2009; Steytler forthcoming. 
52  Steytler 2007. 
53  Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 (4) BCLR 347 (CC). 
54  Weare and Another v Ndebele and Others, 2009 (4) BCLR 370 (CC) para. 70. A bookie, taking bets at horse-
racing, complained that he was discriminated against in KwaZulu-Natal because in terms of that province’s 
gambling legislation only a person in his or her personal capacity could obtain a betting licence, contrary to the 
position that prevailed in all other provinces, where both a natural and a juridical person could ply the bookmak-
ing trade. The Court found that, because the gambling law was within the province’s competence, it did not of-
fend the right against unfair discrimination. 
55  Sections 26(2) and (27(2) Constitution. 
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on their circumstances, and in the circumstances the City’s policy was regarded as reasonable. These 
qualifications allowed the City some autonomy in terms of how the right is implemented, but the 




Although the «reasonableness» requirement afforded the Court an opening to grant a measure of 
diversity, on the whole it has established a floor of rights that is very high by all accounts. The next 
question, then, is whether provinces and municipalities have shown diversity by increasing the level 
of rights in their jurisdictions. 
2.2  Setting new norms from below 
Provinces have the competence, through the adoption of a provincial constitution, to include their 
own bill of rights. 
57
 Such power, however, is limited by two constraints. First, in terms of the prin-
ciple of homogeneity, a provincial bill should not detract from any of the rights in the national Bill 
of Rights, even though it could add more rights.
58
 Second, such additional rights could be included 
only within the functional areas of provincial competence.  
For this reason, KwaZulu-Natal province’s attempt to include a bill of rights in an otherwise fatally 
flawed constitution failed as the rights included stretched far beyond the province’s competences.
59
 
When the Western Cape province drafted its provincial constitution shortly after the KwaZulu-Natal 
attempt, it, too, wanted a bill of rights. The perception was that any self-respecting subnational gov-
ernment should, like the German Länder or US states, have one. When it dawned on lawmakers that 
a provincial bill of rights would add further constraints to the provincial government, the politicians 
quickly downgraded the proposed bill of rights to Directive Principles of Provincial Policy – which 
are unenforceable.
60 
But while the Western Cape’s politicians backed off from a bill of rights, a year 
later the very same politicians did indirectly shape the content of the important socio-economic right 
of access to health care services.  
After the ascendency of Thabo Mbeki as president in 1999, and at the height of the HIV/AIDS pan-
demic in South Africa, the National Department of Health and eight provincial departments of health 
reluctantly allowed Nevirapine, a new drug preventing mother-to-child infection by HIV, to be pro-
vided at only two test sites per province. This restrictive policy flowed from President Mbeki’s deni-
al that there is a link between HIV and AIDS. One province, the Western Cape, was convinced that 
the government’s policy was wrong, and rolled out the drug to all clinics in the province. In a legal 
challenge by an NGO (in which the Community Law Centre acted as an amicus curiae), founded on 
the «the right to have access to health care services, including reproductive health care»,
61
 the rea-
sonableness of the actions of the national government and the eight provinces was attacked.
62
 The 
                                                        
56  See Bond and Dugard 2008. 
57  Section 142 Constitution. See generally Woolman 2007. 
58  Section 143 Constitution. 
59  In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996, 1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC). 
60  Section 82 Constitution of the Western Cape 1 of 1998. On the provincial constitution, see In re: Certification of 
the Constitution of the Western Cape, 1997 (9) BCLR 1167 (CC). 
61  S 27(1)(a) Constitution.  
62  Minister of Health and other v Treatment Action Campaign (1), 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) para. 93. 
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claimant had to show that this conduct was «unreasonable» and that providing the drug in all clinics 
was «within available resources» of all provinces, the two qualifications of the right.  
To both questions the Western Cape’s conduct provided the answer. It showed that by providing the 
drug the desired outcome was achieved. Mother-to-child infection was prevented, thus saving the 
lives of thousands of infants; any conduct to the contrary was obviously unreasonable. Furthermore, 
it showed that providing the drug in all clinics was well within the resources of the Western Cape. 
As all provinces were reliant on national transfers for 97 percent of their income, it was within the 
available resources of the other provinces as well. The Constitutional Court agreed with both argu-
ments and ordered the roll-out of the drug to all clinics nation-wide. The end-result was a fine exam-
ple of how innovation and experimentation by a province (such innovation being part of the rationale 
for federalism) gave content to the right of access to health-care services.
63 
It is also a clear example 
of how standard-setting by a federal court took away the discretion of eight provinces.  No one 
pushed, however, the argument for federal diversity where misguided provincial decisions were 
costing the lives of babies.  
In 2010 the Constitutional Court went further with standard-setting by creating a new right – the 
right to basic municipal services, including electricity. A right of access to electricity is not included 
in the list of socio-economic rights (the rights of access to water, food, health services and housing). 
In order to force municipalities to provide electricity, human rights lawyers have argued that in an 
urban setting access to electricity is an integral part of realising the right of access to housing
64 
(the 
need for heating), or food
65
 (the need to prepare food), as well as other rights.  
In a case where apartment dwellers could not rely on a private law contract with the City of Johan-
nesburg to restore their access to electricity, they had to base their claim on a public duty of the mu-
nicipality to provide electricity.
66
 The City strongly objected because this would turn its competence 
to provide electricity in terms of private law contracts into an enforceable constitutional obligation. 
The Constitutional Court came to the assistance of the applicants, but chose not to base its order for 
the restoration of electricity supply on the right of access to housing.
67
 Instead it formulated a new 
right, the right to basic municipal services, which includes access to electricity. Although no such 
right is mentioned in the chapter in the Constitution devoted to local government, the Court derived 
it from what was previously regarded as the unenforceable «objects» of local government,
68
 namely, 
the general function of providing basic services.
69
 
                                                        
63  See Steytler 2003. 
64  S 26(1), quoted above. 
65  S 27(1)(b) reads: «Everyone has the right to have access to […] sufficient food and water». 
66  Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC). The tenants in an apartment building made payment for 
their electricity consumption to their landlord, who was the contracting party with the municipality for the provi-
sion of electricity. The landlord received the money from the tenants, but never paid the electricity account to the 
municipality. The municipality thereupon cut off the supply to the building, leaving the tenants in a dire situation 
without electricity, one which was not due to any fault of their own. They could not sue the municipality for re-
connection because there was no private law contractual relationship between them and the municipality, only be-
tween the municipality and the landlord, who was now bankrupt. The only avenue open was to claim a public 
right to electricity. 
67  Section 26(1) Constitution. 
68  Section 152 Constitution. 
69  At para 33. See further Steytler and De Visser 2012, ch 9. 
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From a federal perspective it is clear that the Court effectively transformed a municipal competence 
into an obligation; a discretionary power became a duty. How is the creation of a new right and obli-
gation squared with a federal discourse of subnational autonomy? Although access to electricity is 
important for one’s quality of life, it is not on the same scale as access to a life-saving anti-retroviral 
drug. Nevertheless, this decision can be justified if the matter is considered in a broader context, 
namely, the failure of local government in many parts of the country. One of the primary values of 
federalism is the democracy argument that subnational governments are more accountable to their 
electorate because they are closer to the people; accordingly, poor service delivery would in theory 
be punished at the polls. This rationale, however, does not hold with municipalities in South Africa, 
where, despite dismal performances by the majority of municipalities, the same majority party gets 
voted in year after year.
70
 The country’s current political configuration makes subnational accounta-
bility a far-flung prospect, and in the meantime the courts do not appear to be willing to sit back and 
accept the bitter fruits of federal diversity – that is, a lack of poor services and the rule of impunity. 
Instead they have commenced governing from the centre. 
2.3  Bill of Rights shaping the federal structures themselves 
The impact of poor governance by subnational governments also featured prominently in the second 
type of constitutional conversation about how the Bill of Rights may shape the federal structures 
themselves by either subtracting, or adding, functions or creating new structures. 
2.3.1 Taking powers away 
The central feature of provincial governments is that they share power with the national government 
with respect to a list of concurrent functional areas. Due to the fact that new provinces were created 
in 1994, a transitional arrangement held that, in the field of concurrent jurisdiction, the power of 
administering existing national legislation would be assigned to provinces should they have the ca-
pacity to administer them effectively. The administration of social security (pensions as well as vari-
ous disability grants) was thus entrusted in 1994 to provinces, but ten years later an individual com-
plainant, Mr Mashava, showed that the province of Limpopo was violating his right of access to 
social security 
71
 through rank incompetence and maladministration.
72
 
Although «social welfare» is a national and provincial concurrent competency, Mashavha argued 
that the administration of the Social Security Act, 1992, in terms of which disability grants were 
dispensed, should never have been assigned to provinces because they did not have the capacity to 
undertake it. The Constitutional Court agreed: on the basis of a single case brought against one prov-
ince, it declared invalid the assignment of the Social Assistance Act to all nine provinces ten years 
after the assignment became effective. The Court thus approached the problem as a single symmet-
rical issue and disregarded the diversity of performance by other provinces, some which did well and 
others of which, such as Limpopo, did badly. It applied the second, corrective, aspect of the principle 
of subsidiarity, namely, that if a lower level government fails in a task, the higher level government 
                                                        
70  Booysen 2012. 
71  S 27(1)(c) Constitution reads: Everyone has the right to have access to […] social security, including, if they are 
unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate assistance. 
72  Mashavha v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 2004 (12) BCLR 1243 (CC).  
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should step into the breach. However, the Court ignored the first, and primary, aspect of subsidiarity, 
namely, that an action should be performed by the government closest to the beneficiaries unless it is 
unable to do so effectively. Through the application of a single standard, all of the provinces were 
punished for the sins of a single one. 
2.3.2 Adding powers 
The primary aspect of subsidiarity was, however, the implicit basis for the Court’s expansion of 
local government’s obligations if not its powers. As noted at the beginning, in the first case on the 
right of access to housing, the Constitutional Court did not directly expand local government’s man-
date to provide emergency housing, but instructed the three spheres of government to provide collec-
tively a roof over the head of the destitute woman, Irene Grootboom.
73
 Because the question of 
whom was responsible was not determined, the three spheres of government squabbled uncoopera-
tively among themselves about who was to provide shelter, and, at the end, Irene Grootboom died 
without a roof over her head.  
When it was again confronted by an emergency housing case, the Constitutional Court – perhaps 
having learned from the Grootboom matter – did not hesitate to impose an obligation on the munici-
pality alone to provide temporary shelter for persons evicted and left homeless. The City of Johan-
nesburg was once more at the receiving end, arguing unsuccessfully that in terms of the constitution-
al division of powers it was not responsible for housing, including emergency accommodation: this 
was the function of the province of Gauteng, or of the national government.
74
 For the first time the 
Court acknowledged that, in the case of homelessness, a right in the Bill of Rights «competes» with 
the constitutional allocation of powers between the three spheres of government.
75
 However, the 
Court reasoned, the very situation of the City as «the main point of contact with the community»
76 
was determinative of the resolution of the competition. The City is «best situated to react to, engage 
with and prospectively plan around the needs of local communities».
77 
The City was thus ordered to 
provide, from its own resources, emergency housing for evictees left homeless. 
What the Court did was in effect to rewrite the constitutional provisions outlining the powers and 
functions of local government. This foray into constitutional redrafting has, however, broad policy 
support; in the national government’s current policy review of the allocation of powers and functions 
among the three spheres of government, there is broad unanimity that housing should belong to local 
government since it is key to the governance of urban areas and directly linked to important munici-
pal functions such as water, sanitation, electricity and planning.
78
 The underlying rationale for the 
Court’s decision and the policy position on housing is the principle of subsidiarity,
79
 a rationale 
which flowed not from a pre-existing norm but the necessities of practice: here, the question is 
which sphere of government is best situated to give the homeless shelter.  
                                                        
73  Government of the RSA and Others v Grootboom and Others, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
74  City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another (Law-
yers for Human Rights as Amicus Curiae), 2012 (2) BCLR 150 (CC). 
75  At para 16. 
76  At para 45. 
77  At para 57. 
78  See National Planning Commission 2012, 434–435. 
79  De Visser 2011. 
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Although the Court expanded the functional areas of municipalities to include housing, it did so in a 
way that denuded this «new» competence from much of its discretionary content. Again, the only 
justification for the Court’s «governing from the centre» is the plight of homeless people, people 
who deemed to be falling through the cracks in a system of cooperative government that does not 
offer them effective protection.  
2.3.3 Source of new structures 
The last question is whether the Bill of Rights may give rise to claims to further or new federal struc-
tures. In the Bill of Rights a faint whiff of group rights can be detected in the heavily circumscribed 
right to mother-tongue education
80 
even though it has no territorial dimension. However, the Consti-
tution does contain the right to self-determination, albeit that it is not included in the Bill of Rights 
but mentioned in a separate section at the end of the Constitution. This right was part of the com-
promise reached between the liberation movement and right-wing Afrikaners who sought to claim 
their own «volkstaat». Section 235 gives recognition to the «right of self-determination of any com-
munity sharing a common cultural and language heritage within a territorial entity» in the country.
81 
Although Section 235 couches this supposed right in the phraseology of a rights-based discourse, its 
value is undercut by the provision that it is to be determined by national legislation. In other words, 
if expressed in national legislation, section 235 could well lead to a new federal structure. Neverthe-
less, in the current dispensation this is a very distant likelihood; the provision is regarded as little 
more than a relic and souvenir from the era of the negotiated peace settlement.
82
 
2.4  Concluding remarks 
To sum up, the South African conversations between the Bill of Rights and the federal structure have 
been mostly one-sided. The pre-eminent position of the Bill of Rights – the finest product of the new 
democratic dispensation – towers above the Constitution’s federal elements, the utility of which have 
been consistently questioned by the ruling party. The Court’s implementation of the Bill of Rights 
has had a strong centralising effect as well as having set uniform standards for provinces and munic-
ipalities, thereby limiting their scope for diversity. The Court’s role can be explained partly by the 
lack of credibility of the federal system itself. Vital sustaining elements of a successful federal sys-
tem are absent. First, a democratically accountable system is largely absent at provincial and local 
level in that poor governance is not punished at the polls, and, second, as a result of the first, poor 
service delivery continues with impunity. Most provinces have not been laboratories of innovation or 
experimentation but institutions instead for party-political patronage; for similar reasons many are 
all-but dysfunctional. In this milieu the Court has not taken the Constitution’s federal aspects seri-
ously. With the human needs of the poor crying out for state intervention, the Court – rather than 
protecting or increasing subnational autonomy – has used the Bill of Rights as a means of ruling 
from the centre.  
                                                        
80  S 29(2) Constitution. 
81  S 235 Constitution. 
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In conclusion, it is clear that the South African conversation echoes the international debate and may 
even contribute something to it, if only in a negative sense.  
First, in most countries the conversation between the two parts of a federal constitution – the bill of 
rights and federal structure – is not between equals. Most often the Bill of Rights predominates, 
resulting in the centralisation of power and the standardisation of federal diversity. South Africa 
offers as an extreme example of this tendency. 
Second, the centralising and standardising effects of a bill of rights have been moderated by some 
federal courts by establishing a minimum floor of rights, thereby inviting subnational governments 
to increase rights protection and allowing a margin of appreciation where the core values of particu-
lar rights have not yet been widely settled. Where the core values of life and dignity are at stake, the 
South African courts echo the international practice of allowing little or no subnational autonomy.  
Third, the dynamics of the conversation between the federal structure and the bill of rights depend 
on a number of factors, including the text of the constitution, the political and historical context of 
the federal system, as well as the functioning of the federation. Where the federal structure lies at the 
heart of the constitutional enterprise (or later settles there), a more moderated constitutional conver-
sation is likely. The Brazilian Constitution, which provides that no amendment may abolish the fed-
eral form, or the Indian Constitution, where the Supreme Court regarded the federal structure as an 
unamendable part of the Constitution,
83
 may produce a very different conversation than that in South 
Africa, where the provincial structure is more of an irritant reminder of the negotiated past than 
something deeply valued by the state.  
Whether this hypothesis holds will be nicely tested in the new Kenyan Constitution of 2010, which 
came into operation on 4 March 2013.
84 
The Constitution lists, as national values, the «sharing and 
devolution of power, the rule of law, democracy and the participation of the people» and then con-
tinues with the values of «human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, equality, human 
rights, non-discrimination and protection of the marginalised».
85 
Furthermore, both the Bill of Rights 
and the chapter on devolution are at the core of preventing the abuse of centralised power by an 
autocratic presidency. The protection of both devolution and human rights could arguably carry 
equal weight.  
The functioning of the federal system is also critical. The impact of a bill of rights is unlikely to be 
moderated where the federal structures do not deliver on the basic values of federalism. The South 
African courts illustrate that federal diversity will not enjoy much consideration in situations where 
accountable democratic government and effective service delivery are not routinely produced by 
subnational governments and where rule from the centre becomes the only answer. This is of par-
ticular importance for fragile countries emerging from conflict and hoping that federal or devolved 
systems of government will enable them to address the causes of conflicts. 
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The final point to make concerns the role of federal structures in the protection of human rights. The 
notion originally underpinning federalism was that the diffusion of state power would limit the pos-
sibility of the abuse of power at the centre;
86
 in addition, this would allow people greater access to 
participation in governance at lower levels as well as protect minorities.
87
 Once again, South Africa 
provides a supporting example in the fact that a province contested a misguided national policy on 
HIV/AIDS, which led to it being overturned.  
Subnational governments also have the potential to provide a complementary, or even better, system 
for the protection of human rights; but, of course, there is no guarantee they will do so. While the 
national rights discourse may predominate, subnational governments can make their voice better 
heard when they perform their function as constitutional laboratories, experimenting and finding 
innovative solutions to old and new problems, solutions which can then be replicated at federal level 
and so advance human security. It is a characteristic unique to federal systems, and gives them an 
enduring advantage over centralised systems.
88 
 
This has also been the approach adopted by the Community Law Centre in its work in South Africa 
and elsewhere on the continent. Federal structures are not an end in themselves but important state 
institutions that can uniquely pursue the primary objectives of building peace, promoting develop-
ment and limiting the abuse of centralised government. They can do so by means of innovative and 
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